Under which conditions do oligopolists have an incentive to share private information about a stochastic demand or stochastic costs? We present a general model which encompasses virtually all models of the existing literature on information sharing as special cases. Within this unifying framework we show that in contrast to the apparent inconclusiveness of previous results some simple principles determining the incentives to share information can be obtained. Existing results are generalized, some previous interpretations are questioned, and new explanations offered, leading to a single general theory for a large class of models. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C72, C73, D82, L13.
INTRODUCTION
Theoretical research on information sharing in oligopoly was pioneered by Novshek and Sonnenschein [13] , Clarke [2] , and Vives [21] . Since then, numerous contributions on this topic have appeared. While the models analyzed vary along several dimensions, their basic structure is the same. According to the received view on the current state of this field, there is no general theory regarding the incentives of firms to share private information; rather, the results of the models depend delicately on the specific assumptions.
article no. 0117 In this paper we analyze a general model of information sharing in oligopoly. The model is constructed so as to encompass virtually all models in the current literature as special cases, resulting from appropriate specification of the parameters. The analysis of the model not only leads to results more general than previous ones; more importantly, a small number of forces driving the incentives to share information in most types of models can be identified. It is argued that previous interpretations of information sharing models are not always consistent with the formal analyses, and we suggest a new explanation for the incentives to reveal information.
The structure of our model is the same as that used in previous works: (i) In an n-firm oligopoly with differentiated goods, firms face either a stochastic intercept of a linear demand function or a stochastic marginal cost, which can be different for each firm. The deviation of the vector of demand interceptsÂcosts from its mean, the``State of Nature,'' is unknown to the firms. (ii) Instead, each firm receives a private signal with information about the true State of Nature. For example, firms might receive noisy signals about the intercept of a common demand function, or they might know their own costs exactly, but not the costs of the rival firms. (iii) Private information can be exchanged, where we assume that firms commit themselves either to reveal their private information to other firms or to keep it private before receiving any private information. (vi) In the last stage, the``oligopoly game,'' firms noncooperatively set prices or quantities so as to maximize expected profits conditional on the available private and revealed information.
Following the literature, we use two different approaches to analyze the revelation behavior of firms: In the simpler case, we determine under which conditions industry-wide contracts on information sharing are profitable, by comparing the expected equilibrium profits with and without information sharing. Alternatively, we assume that firms decide on their revelation behavior simultaneously and independently, thus allowing for asymmetric revelation decisions.
How, then, do pricesÂquantities and expected profits with and without information sharing depend on the characteristics of the market, and how does this affect the incentives for firms to exchange information in the first place?
I will not review in detail the various contributions addressing these questions; a brief survey can be found in Vives [23] . It has been noted by Vives [23] and others that the results concerning the incentives to share information seem to depend sensitively on the specific assumptions of the model: A change from Cournot to Bertrand, from substitutes to complements, from demand to cost uncertainty, or from a common value to``private values,'' referring to an n-dimensional State of Nature for n firms, may lead to completely different outcomes. More disturbingly, apparently similar models often lead to contrasting results. Three points shall illustrate that the existing literature cannot satisfactorily explain the diversity of results, or worse, that only little seems to be known about the forces driving each particular result.
(i) According to the received view, there are two main effects of information sharing from the viewpoint of the firms (excluding collusion in the priceÂquantity setting stage). On one hand, each firm is better informed about the prevailing market conditions, which is presumably profitable. On the other hand, the homogenization of information among firms leads to a change in the correlation of the strategies. An increase in the correlation in turn is profitable for Bertrand competition but not for Cournot competition. The overall profitability is then determined by the sum of these two effects.
Except for some special cases, however, this well-known reasoning is either inapplicable or flawed: First, if a firm is perfectly informed about its own cost, it is in general not true that it benefits from obtaining information about its rivals as well (Fried [3] , Sakai [16] ). Second, the change in the correlation of strategies is itself endogeneous and not easily predicted. We show that contrary to what is sometimes believed, it is in general not true that information sharing always leads to an increase in the correlation, or that the correlation increases with a common value and decreases with private values. Finally, it is also shown that the relationship mentioned above, between a change in the correlation of strategies and its effect on expected profits, is not quite as generally valid as is usually assumed.
(ii) Vives [21] , Gal-Or [4] , and Li [10] have shown that in a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods and demand uncertainty firms do not share information in the equilibrium of the two-stage game described above. In contrast, Fried [3] , Li [10] , and Shapiro [19] have shown that in a Cournot market with uncertainty about private costs firms completely reveal information in the equilibrium. This contrast has been attributed to the difference between a common value, e.g., the intercept of a common demand function, and private values, e.g., different marginal costs for the firms. But the results for private values in many models hold even if the correlation of marginal costs approaches unity, although economically, this situation is equivalent to a model with a common value. Therefore, this interpretation is inconsistent with the models as it suggests a discontinuity of profits in the underlying parameters which one would not expect in this class of models.
(iii) Vives [21] shows that in a duopoly with differentiated products and demand uncertainty, a change from substitutes to complements or from Cournot to Bertrand yields opposite results as to the incentives to share information. This may be attributed to a change in the slope of the reaction curves. However, in the private-values, cost-uncertainty model of Gal-Or [5] there is only a difference between Cournot and Bertrand but not between substitutes and complements. Finally, in Sakai's [17] model firms always share information, regardless of whether they set prices or quantities, or whether the goods are substitutes or complements. Hence from these results, very little can be concluded about the role of the type of competition and the characteristics of goods.
The results of the analysis in this paper imply that these interpretative problems can all be resolved.
1. We argue (prior to the formal analysis) that the distinctive characteristic of most so-called private-value models is not the independence of (say) costs, but the fact that firms are perfectly informed about their own cost. We therefore introduce a new distinction between independent-value models and what we label``perfect-signal'' models.
2. The correlation of strategies increases with information sharing in the case of a common value; with independent values or perfect signals, however, the direction of change depends on the slope of the reaction curves.
3.(a) For Cournot markets, and for Bertrand markets with demand uncertainty, there are some simple general results underlying almost all previous results: With perfect signals or uncorrelated demandsÂcosts, or with a common value and strategic complements, complete information pooling is an equilibrium of the two-stage game (which is efficient from the viewpoint of the firms), regardless of all other parameters. With a common value and strategic substitutes, no pooling is the equilibrium solution. This solution is efficient in Cournot markets with homogeneous goods and inefficient for a large degree of product differentiation. It is shown that the profitability of information sharing in most models with cost uncertainty is driven merely by the assumption that firms know their own costs with certainty, which refutes previous interpretations attributing these results to other factors.
(b) For the remaining case, Bertrand markets with cost uncertainty, the incentives are rather ambiguous. It turns out that results derived for duopoly models (Gal-Or [5] ) may be reversed in the case of many firms. More importantly, this case provides a counterexample to a common belief according to which, e.g., an increase in the correlation of strategies due to information sharing is profitable if the reaction curves are upward-sloping. 4 . For the cases mentioned under 3(a), we suggest a new explanation for the incentives to reveal private information which rests on two principles: (i) Letting the rivals acquire a better knowledge of their respective profit functions leads to a higher correlation of strategies, the profitability of which is determined by the slope of the reaction curves. (ii) Letting the rivals acquire a better knowledge of one's own profit function always increases the own expected profits by inducing a change in the correlation of strategies in the profitable direction. The incentive to reveal information is then determined by the sum of these two effects.
GENERAL MODEL
In this section, a stochastic n-firm oligopoly model with private information is introduced at its most general level. In later sections, when we analyze particular aspects of information sharing, we will have to impose additional symmetry assumptions.
We first discuss the main elements of the model: the State of Nature, private information, information sharing, and strategies and payoffs. Subsequently, explicit game formulations are given.
State of Nature. The State of Nature is denoted by the random variable {=({ 1 , ..., { n )$, where { i is the deviation of either the marginal cost or the intercept of a linear demand function of firm i from its mean, depending on the type of uncertainty under consideration. 1 Note that for demand uncertainty, the intercepts may be different for each firm as well as for cost uncertainty. The variables { i are normal with zero mean, variance t s , and covariance t n # [0, t s ]. For I denoting the n-dimensional unit matrix, @=(1, 1, ..., 1)$, and I =@@$&I, the covariance matrix of { is therefore given by t s I+t n I =: T.
Private information. The State-of-Nature variable { i enters into firm i 's profit function (see below) but is unknown to i. Instead, before setting a price or quantity, the firm costlessly receives a noisy signal y i about { i as private information: y i :={ i +' i . The signal noise ' i is normal with zero mean, variance u ii , and covariance u n # [0, min i [u ii ]]. Thus the covariance matrix of '=(' 1 , ..., ' n ) is diag(u 11 , ..., u nn )+u n I :=U. Furthermore, we assume that { and ' are independent, which implies Cov(y)=T+U=: P.
The precision of firm i's signal is given by u
&1
ii : If u ii =0, firm i is perfectly informed about { i (e.g., its own cost); a positive u ii implies a noisy signal, and for u ii = , y i does not convey any information.
We follow Gal-Or [4] in allowing that the signal errors ' i be correlated. For example, publicly accessible predictions about business cycles might enter into all y i inducing a correlation which has nothing to do with the true State of Nature. Hence the private signals may be correlated (i) due to a correlation of the components of the State of Nature and (ii) due to correlation of the signal errors. 2, 3 We assume throughout that the correlation of the signal errors does not exceed the correlation of the State-of-Nature components. This is stated more precisely in Assumption COR. t n u ii t s u n \i. Let t n Ât s =: \ { and u n Â-u ii u jj =: \ ij ' (for u ii , u jj >0) denote the correlation coefficients of { and ', respectively. Then COR implies \ ij ' \ { for all i and j. If the u ii are all equal, the two statements are equivalent. Assumption COR is automatically satisfied for all models of the literature. In the general model this assumption has to be made explicitly; its significance will become clear in the next section.
Information revelation. Firms reveal their private information completely, partially, or not at all, to all other firms by means of a signal y^i :=y i +! i , where ! i is normal with zero mean and variance r i . The ! i are independent of each other and of { and ', hence for r=(r 1 , ..., r n )$ and y^=( y^1 , ..., y^n)$ we have Cov(!)=diag(r) and Cov(y^)=T+U+diag(r)=: Q. The variance r i of the noise added to the true signal y i expresses the revelation behavior of firm i: for r i =0, y i is completely revealed to the other firms; for r i = a noisy signal with infinite variance is revealed, which is equivalent to concealing private information. For 0<r i < , private information is revealed partially: the signal y i is distorted by the noise ! i , which reduces the informativeness of y^i according to the variance r i . Note that y i cannot be strategically distorted, since ! i and y i are independent and ! i has zero mean. Hence apart from random noise, private information is (if at all) revealed truthfully, or equivalently, revealed information can be verified at no cost. 4 Strategies and payoffs. Finally, we turn to the market structure of the model. Demand and cost functions are not explicit elements of the model. Instead, we directly formulate the profit functions. Each firm i controls the variable s i , which is either the price of the good produced by i (Bertrand 265 INFORMATION SHARING IN OLIGOPOLY markets) or the quantity supplied (Cournot). The payoff for firm i is given by
where : i ({ i ) is any function of { i , and ; ii , ; n , # s , # n , $ and = are parameters. We assume that $>0 and
The parametric profit function (2.1) suits a large range of standard oligopoly models, in particular, all types discussed in the information sharing literature (see Table I further below). This includes Cournot models with a linear demand system and linear or quadratic costs and Bertrand models with a linear demand system and linear costs, both for n firms producing heterogeneous goods. On the other hand, this also implies that there are no clear-cut economic interpretations of the parameters.
For all models with demand uncertainty (Cournot or Bertrand), # s equals 1, and for Cournot models with cost uncertainty, # s equals &1. In all these cases, # n equals zero. Hence (i) for Cournot competition, # s indicates the source of uncertainty, and (ii) only in the case of a Bertrand market with cost uncertainty, # n will take a nonzero value, the importance of which will be seen in later sections.
The linear-quadratic specification (2.1) arises from an underlying linear demand system with a coefficient matrix of the form D=$I+=I in both the Cournot and the Bertrand case. Such a demand system can be derived as the first-order condition of a representative consumer's maximization of an appropriately defined utility function (cf. Vives [21] , SakaiÂYamato [18] ), which in turn requires that the matrix D (or D &1 , respectively) be positive definite, leading to the restriction on = and $ stated above.
From (2.1), 2 ? i Â s i s j =&=. Hence for =>0 (e.g., Cournot with substitute goods or Bertrand with complements), we have a game of strategic substitutes, i.e., downward-sloping reaction curves, and strategic complements for =<0.
Game structures. We can now formulate the explicit game(s) that will be analyzed. The model consists of the following stages:
(i) Firms decide on their revelation behavior by setting r i . We will consider two variants: (a) firms enter into a contract specifying that information shall be revealed completely or not at all, i.e., r i =0 \i or r i = \i; (b) firms set the r i 's simultaneously, where we exclude partial revelation but allow asymmetric behavior, i.e., r i # [0, ] \i.
(ii) The State of Nature { is determined randomly. The players know the distribution of { but not its realization.
(iii) Each firm i receives a private signal y i . The distribution of y is common knowledge.
(iv) y i is revealed completely, partially, or not at all, to all other firms by means of y^i . The revelation behavior is given by r i , and r is known to all firms.
(v) Firms play the oligopoly game, i.e., each firm i sets the priceÂ quantity s i conditional on the information z i :=( y i , y^$)$ available to firm i.
Information structures. In Section 4, we will focus on some special cases of information structures to which the literature has restricted its attention. The first is the case of a Common Value, where according to the usual modelling the State of Nature is a scalar entering into all firms' profits. Equivalently (since we are concerned with statistical decisions), we can assume that the n (identically distributed) components of the State of Nature are perfectly correlated, since then all { i are equal with probability one. We refer to this case as Assumption CV (Common Value). t n =t s =: t. All other cases, in which the State of Nature is a nondegenerate n-vector, have been referred to as private-value models. However, here we will distinguish two different kinds of those models. The first is the case where the components of the State of Nature are uncorrelated:
Assumption IV (Independent Values). t n =u n =0, where setting u n to zero (uncorrelated signal errors) follows from COR. In fact, the work of Gal-Or [5] is the only one in which assumption IV is made. In most of the other private-value models, any correlation between the State-of-Nature components is allowed for. But it is additionally assumed that firms receive signals without noise, i.e., acquire perfect knowledge about their``own'' { i . We refer to this case as Assumption PS (Perfect Signals). u ii =u n =0 \i. Hence in this case, ' degenerates to a zero distribution. Our separation of models classified as private-value models in the literature into two categories has two reasons: First, it seems more appropriate to refer to a``common value'' and``private values'' as limit cases of the correlation of the { i lying between 0 and 1 rather than speak of a common value in the case of perfect correlation and of private values for any other case, including both independence and a correlation arbitrarily close to 1. Second and more important, only by taking the impact of signal noise into account, the apparent inconsistency pointed out in the Introduction between the results in common-value models and the results in certain``private-value'' models can be explained: The existence or nonexistence of signal noise is the only 
remaining difference between these types of models. The role of signal noise has not received any attention in previous work.
Almost all models of the literature are special cases of the model developed here, resulting by appropriately specifying the parameters. 5 These specifications are shown in Table I . Note in particular that all models belong to one of the three classes, CV, IV, and PS, introduced above.
NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF THE OLIGOPOLY GAME
In this section, we derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the oligopoly game. At this last stage, the revelation behavior r=(r 1 , ..., r n )$ is known to all firms, and each firm i has information z i =( y i , y^$)$. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium s* of this subgame is characterized by
leading to the reaction functions
where expectations are formed over all random variables unknown at this stage, i.e., the State of Nature and the signal errors ' &i of the rival firms.
Following the usual procedure, we derive the equilibrium strategies in two steps: First, we establish existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium with strategies s i that are affine functions of z i . In the second step, the coefficients of these functions are computed.
Proposition 3.1. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the oligopoly game for given information vectors z i (i=1, ..., n). The equilibrium strategies s i (z i ) are affine in z i ; i.e., for all i, there exist a i , b i # R and c i # R n such that s i =a i +b i y i +c$ i y^.
For the proofs of all results, see the Appendix.
Having established linearity of the equilibrium strategies, we now compute the coefficients a i , b i , c i . To evaluate the first-order conditions (3.1), we first compute the conditional expectations E({ i | z i ) and E( y j | z i ).
Let p ii :=t s +u ii \i and p n :=t n +u n denote the variances and covariances of the signals y i , respectively. Furthermore, define m i :=( p ii & p n +r i ) &1 and m :=(m 1 , ..., m n )$. Finally, let e i denote the ith unit vector. Proposition 3.2. For given z i , the conditional expectations for { i and y j are
where
and t^i=t s + p n (t s &t n ) :
Setting r i = for all i implies m=0 and g^i=h ij =0 for all i. Thus no use is made of the revealed signals y^, which is equivalent to a situation without information sharing. 6 
INFORMATION SHARING IN OLIGOPOLY
The expression for g^i makes the significance of assumption COR clear: since t n p ii &t s p n =t n u ii &t s u n , COR implies that the components of g^i are nonnegative, which in turn ensures that a correlation of y i and y j is attributed to a correlation of { i and { j rather than to a correlation of the signal errors. Substituting E(s j | z i )=a j +b j E( y j | z i )+c$ j y^and the expressions from Proposition 3.2 in (3.1) yields
On the other hand, s i =a i +b i y i +c$ i y^. Identification of these coefficients with the corresponding terms in (3.2) leads to the main result of this section:
Proposition 3.3. In the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the oligopoly game each firm i (i=1, ..., n) has the strategy s i (z i )=a i +b i y i +c$ i y^, where
The equilibrium strategies of the models of other works result as corollaries of Proposition 3.3: this applies for Clarke [2] [17] , and SakaiÂYamato [18] .
An inspection of the expressions of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 shows that although firm i does not use y^i for the expectations about { i or y j , y^i , her strategy s i does depend on y^i since it enters into E(s j | z i ).
The strategies for the situation without information sharing follow as a limit case from Proposition 3.3 by setting r i = for all i, which implies c i =0 for all i.
Using
(i.e., before firms receive private information) but known revelation behavior r, for simplicity denoted E(?(s)). For Cournot markets and for Bertrand markets with demand uncertainty, # n =0 and hence the last term in (3.3) vanishes. For most of the following sections we restrict the analysis to these cases. Only Section 4.6 is devoted to the remaining case, Bertrand markets with cost uncertainty.
THE INCENTIVES TO SHARE INFORMATION
Several authors have noted that the incentives to share private information are largely determined by the change in the correlation of strategies induced by the pooling of information. However, how this correlation is actually affected in different settings has never been treated analytically. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 address this question. We then study the two approaches to the determination of revelation behavior introduced in Section 2: First, we analyze the incentives to completely pool information, compared with no pooling. Alternatively, we derive the equilibrium of the two-stage game where firms first independently decide on their revelation behavior. A discussion in Section 4.5 draws the threads together. Finally, we turn to the case excluded for most of this paper, Bertrand markets with cost uncertainty.
For the rest of the paper we assume that ; ii =; s for all i. For most applications, this means that the firms have the same expected demand intercepts and marginal costs. Moreover, except for Section 4.6 we henceforth assume that # n =0.
No-Sharing Case
As noted above, complete concealing of private information corresponds to r i = \i, and from Proposition 3.3 we obtain (because of m i =0 and r i m i =1) 
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Without information sharing,
Both the absolute value of b i (the sign of which is determined by # s ) and i's expected profit increase with the precision of y i (parts a, b), whereas they are decreasing (increasing) in the precision of another firm's signal for strategic substitutes (complements) (parts c, d).
For the rest of the paper, we assume that the private signals have equal precisions; i.e., p ii = p s \i. Then E(? i )Â \ y | ps const. t&=, i.e, for a given precision of signals, an increase in the correlation leads to higher expected profits for strategic complements and to lower expected profits for strategic substitutes.
In contrast to the case of Proposition 4.1(b), no relative information advantages of players are involved in result (a). Hence the precision of the private signal matters absolutely as well as in relation to the signals of the rival firms.
Some intuition on the well-known result (b) can be gained by considering a Cournot market with demand uncertainty (cf. Vives [21] ): For a positive signal y i , a higher correlation of signals implies a higher probability that the rival firms have received a high signal as well and supply a larger quantity. Since the reaction curves are downward-sloping, this induces a reduction of the own quantity s i . As a result, i reacts less sensitively to y i , which reduces the expected profit.
The result also explains parts (c) and (d) of Proposition 4.1: an exogenous increase in the precision of another player's signal (leaving the covariance unaffected) does not necessarily per se, i.e., because of an information advantage of the other firm, lead to a change of the expected profit, but rather through the increased correlation of strategies. 8 Hence the profitability depends on the sign of =.
Complete Pooling: Correlation of Strategies
Setting r i =0 \i we obtain the case of complete information sharing: all y i are revealed without noise; all players have the same information. With r i m i =0 and m
Henceforth, we usually focus on the cases CV, IV, and PS introduced above. For the case of a common value (CV), where t s =t n =t, the firms' strategies are identical and affine in the sample mean of the signals: s i =a+(2 $bÂd ) @$y. In the case of perfect signals (PS), where p s =t s and p n =t n , all parameters of random variables cancel out in (4.3), as all uncertainty has vanished (cf. Shapiro [19] ). Using (4.3) we can derive the variance and covariance of the equilibrium strategies, the sign of the correlation, and subsequently the direction of change with respect to the oligopoly without information pooling: Proposition 4.3. For CV, the correlation of equilibrium strategies always increases if information is completely pooled. For IV and PS, the correlation decreases for strategic substitutes and increases for strategic complements.
(In particular, with independent values and strategic substitutes, information sharing leads to a negative correlation of previously uncorrelated strategies.) Proposition 4.3 thus shows that the conjecture that the correlation increases with a common value and decreases with private values (cf. Li [10] , Gal-Or [5] ) is correct for Cournot oligopolies with substitute goods, but not in general.
It is important to notice that Proposition 4.3 does not require that # n =0; i.e., it is valid for both Cournot and Bertrand, for demand and cost uncertainty.
Incentives to Share I: Contractual Approach
The firms' incentives to enter into industry-wide contracts on information sharing are determined by the difference between expected profits with and without information sharing. Using 2E(? i )t2 Var(s i ) the results of Section 4.1, and (A.10), we have
where tÃ :=t s +(n&1) t n , pÄ k := p s +(k&1)p n and t~=(t s &t n )Â( p s & p n ). The sign of this difference does not depend on the sign of # s . Hence at least for Cournot models, the source of uncertainty demand or cost affects the signs of the strategies but is irrelevant for expected profits.
Instead of treating the IV and PS cases separately, we can derive more general results by taking an important similarity between these two cases into account: In both cases, firms do not acquire any new information about their { i 's by the pooling of information. With perfect signals, firm i already knows { i , whereas with uncorrelated signals, it cannot infer anything about { i from the other firms' signals. In the model, this is reflected in the fact that in both cases, g^i=0. Evaluation of (4.4) leads to Proposition 4.4. If g^i=0, hence in particular for IV and PS, complete pooling is always profitable. For CV, pooling is profitable if and only if
The expression on the l.h.s. is positive if + :==Â$ is less than 2Â(n+1) and negative if + is greater than 2(-n&1)Â(n&1)<1, and otherwise depends on the magnitudes of p s and p n .
As corollaries follow the corresponding results of Clarke [2] In a common-value Cournot oligopoly with sufficiently homogeneous goods (= close to $), complete sharing is unprofitable. In contrast, for small positive = corresponding to a large degree of product differentiation, or, for quadratic costs, to quickly increasing marginal costs (cf. Kirby [9] ) information sharing is profitable, as well as for negative = (strategic complements).
The most important consequence of Proposition 4.4 is that with perfect signals, complete pooling is always profitable, regardless of any other parameters of the model. This result is in sharp contrast with the interpretations of Fried [3] , Shapiro [19] , Li [10] , Sakai [17] and SakaiÂYamato [18] , who have attributed the profitability of information sharing to the``private-value'' character of their models or the uncertainty about costs as opposed to demand uncertainty. Rather, the result is completely determined by the assumption that firms have perfect knowledge of their own costs, or in general, of their { i .
The proposition suggests that the unprofitability of information exchange in a homogeneous Cournot market with uncertainty about a common value is a rather exceptional case. Hence in general Clarke's [2] argument that observing an agreement on information sharing may be taken as a prima facie evidence for collusion does not apply.
Incentives to Share II: Noncooperative Approach
We now analyze the two-stage game in which firms simultaneously decide on their revelation behavior before playing the oligopoly game. While the``noncooperativeness'' of this model structure obviously only relates to the revelation decisions, leaving their commitment character unaffected, studying the two-stage game can nevertheless yield important insights about the stability of information sharing arrangements. In particular, we will analyze under which circumstances firms have a dominant revelation strategy in the sense that they commit to a certain revelation behavior (e.g., always to reveal the own signal) regardless of how the other firms decide, in anticipation of the equilibrium of the oligopoly game resulting from the first-stage decisions.
In this subsection, therefore, we allow for asymmetric revelation behavior. However, we exclude partial revelation, i.e., each firm has to decide whether to reveal completely or not at all.
Without loss of generality we assume that the first k players (k # [0, ..., n] ) reveal, whereas the last n&k players conceal their information. A nonrevealing firm (for given k) has an incentive to reveal if
denotes the strategy of a Revealing firm (increasing the number to k+1) and s N, k i the strategy of a Nonrevealing firm (where the number of revealing firms remains k). If this inequality is valid for all k, i has a dominant strategy to reveal (in the sense explained above), and vice versa if the inequality is never fulfilled (cf. Li [10] ).
Setting r i = 0 for i # [1, ..., k] and r i = for i # [k + 1, ..., n] for given k, we can derive the equilibrium strategies for revealing and concealing firms from Proposition 3.3, calculate their variances, and compute the expected profits. This leads to one of the main results of this section:
Proposition 4.5. For CV and g^i=0 (including IV and PS), there always exists a dominant revelation strategy (in the above sense). Information revelation is the dominant strategy if g^i=0, and for CV and strategic complements. For CV and strategic substitutes, nonrevelation is the dominant strategy.
There are many corresponding results in the literature: Proposition 3 in Li [10] and Proposition 3 in Fried [3] follow as corollaries; and similar results are provided by Vives [21] , Gal-Or [4, 5] , Li [10] , and Sakai [17] .
First of all, we observe that in all cases considered there are dominant revelation strategies. Furthermore, the result for PS complements Proposition 4.4: the results obtained by Fried [3] , Li [10] , and Sakai [17] are not due to cost uncertainty or``private values'' but are determined by the mere assumption of perfect signals.
Comparing Propositions 4.4 and 4.5, we see that for most cases, the equilibrium of the two-stage game is efficient from the point of view of the firms. Only for CV with strategic substitutes and small = (large degree of product differentiation) a Prisoner's Dilemma situation arises: complete sharing is profitable but does not occur in the two-stage game (cf. Vives [21] ).
This, in turn, suggests that studying exclusionary disclosure rules (i.e., where only revealing firms have access to information revealed by others; such rules have been considered by Kirby [9] and Shapiro [19] ) might not yield very interesting new insights, since``quid-pro-quo-agreements'' (Kirby [9] ) only become interesting in Prisoner's Dilemma situations where firms insist on the``quo''. For exclusionary agreements among all n firms, of course, the results of Section 4.3 apply.
Discussion of the Results
Excluding Bertrand markets with cost uncertainty from the analysis, we have shown: For CV and strategic complements, and for IV and PS in any case, complete information pooling is an efficient equilibrium of the two-stage game, regardless of all other parameters. For CV and strategic substitutes, no pooling is the equilibrium solution, which is efficient (inefficient) for a small (large) degee of product differentiation. Except for Gal-Or's [5] Bertrand model with cost uncertainty, these statements summarize all results of the literature on the incentives to share information in symmetric models.
To explain the results of Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we start with the wellknown common-value case (cf. Vives [21] ). The pooling of information has two effects: First, each firm has better information about the prevailing market conditions; second, strategies are perfectly correlated. The first effect increases expected profits, whereas the profitability of the second effect depends on the slope of the reaction curves (cf. Proposition 4.2). For strategic complements, then, information sharing is unambiguously profitable. For strategic substitutes (say, a Cournot market with substitute goods), the correlation effect is negative. It outweighs the precision effect in the case of fairly homogeneous goods. With more differentiated goods, in contrast, the precision effect dominates (Proposition 4.4) since there is less intense competition, implying that the adverse effect of a higher correlation of strategies is smaller. 10 In the noncooperative model, the decision to reveal only depends on the correlation effect, since the knowledge of the State of Nature is not influenced by the own revelation behavior (cf. Proposition 3.2). This explains the difference between Propositions 4.4 and 4.5, which gives rise to a Prisoner's Dilemma.
While the distinction of a precision and a correlation effect is very useful in explaining the common-value case, it is of little use for the understanding of the IV and PS cases, as pointed out in the Introduction: Recall that { i denotes the component of the State of Nature which enters into firm i 's profit function. First, information sharing cannot improve firm i's information on { i (cf. 4.3), and it is not clear why it would benefit from improved information about the other { j as such. In fact, Fried [3] and Sakai [16] provide examples in which firms prefer never to receive any signals about the rival's profit function. Second, while the change in the correlation of strategies is clearly important, it is endogenous and not easily predicted. In particular, our results show that in the IV and PS cases information sharing changes the correlation of strategies exactly in the direction that is profitable for the firms! This, of course, undermines the explanatory power of the correlation effect. Therefore, we proceed to explain our results in terms of two rather different, and more general, effects in the change of strategies due to information sharing:``direct adjustments,'' due to an improved knowledge of the own { i , and``strategic adjustments,'' due to an improved knowledge of the rival firms' information and hence their actions.
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These effects can be readily identified analytically: While the direct adjustment is directly related to the magnitude of the parameters of g^i , the strategic adjustments are determined by the parameters of h ij (cf. (3.1) and Proposition 3.2).
The significance of our new distinction is immediately clear: In both cases IV and PS, since g^i=0, there are only strategic adjustments. From Proposition 4.5 we may thus conclude that for IV and PS, unilateral revelation of information to the other firms is profitable because and as long as this induces only strategic adjustments by the rival firms.
Our distinction also sheds new light on the common-value case: While strategic adjustments always alter the correlation of strategies in the direction profitable for the firms (Propositions 4.2b, 4.3, and 4.4), direct adjustments always lead to a higher correlation. Thus with strategic complements, both adjustments are profitable, whereas with strategic substitutes, the negative effect of highly correlated strategies may prevail. For CV, in particular, the components of g^i have their maximal value (cf. Proposition 3.3), implying maximal direct adjustments.
Turning to intermediate cases between IV and CV, in markets with strategic substitutes firms face a trade-off: a firm has an incentive to reveal its private information as long as this does not significantly improve other firms' knowledge of their { j , which would induce direct adjustments by these firms and thereby lead to more intense competition (cf. Fried [3] , Proposition 4]).
Bertrand Markets with Cost Uncertainty
We briefly turn to Bertrand markets with cost uncertainty. Consider the simplest example with the demand function q i =a&$p i &= j{i p j and a random marginal cost c i , for simplicity with zero mean. In terms of the profit function (2.1), # n ==, which is the coefficient for the product c i j{i p j . Such terms vanish in each of the other cases we have been considering but play an important role in this case. Therefore, Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty is structurally different from the other three cases.
With # n {0, the last term in (3.3) does not vanish. As a consequence, the analysis becomes considerably more complicated, and the results are much more ambiguous, than in the other cases. Therefore, I will only summarize the results without presenting the formal analysis in full detail. As to the method of analysis, it suffices to analyze the last term in (3.3) under different informational settings, proceeding exactly as in the previous sections, and then combine the results with the corresponding results derived in 4.1 4.4.
In contrast to the simple results in the previous sections, the profitability of industry-wide contracts on information sharing in general depends on the magnitudes of $, =, and n. Similarly, the profitability of unilateral information revelation depends on the these parameters. Moreover, in general there do not even exist dominant revelation strategies.
Only in the case of independent values does a dominant revelation strategy exist. This strategy depends on the difference between expected profits for unilateral revelation vs concealing, which has the same sign as &4(2$&=)&(n&1) =(4$&3=). If =>0 or n=2, to conceal information is a dominant revelation strategy. This was shown by Gal-Or [5] for the duopoly case. However, for negative = and n Ä , revealing becomes a dominant strategy. Thus, even when a dominant revelation strategy exists, whether this strategy involves revelation or not depends on the specific parameters. Results obtained for duopolies do not extend to larger markets.
To see why this case is so different, contrast the profit functions for a Bertrand duopoly for demand uncertainty, ? i = p i (a&{ i &$p i &=p j ), and for cost uncertainty, ? i =( p i &{ i )(a&$p i &=p j ). For substitutes, = is negative. In both cases, a positive { i will affect the profit negatively. Now fix p i as a random variable and consider how the expected profits in both cases depend on the rival's strategy p j . For demand uncertainty, the term &=E( p i p j ) enters into the expected profits. Hence, we obtain the wellknown result that expected profits are increasing in the correlation of the firms' strategies. With cost uncertainty, in contrast, we get &=E( p i p j )+ =E({ i p j ). With information sharing, the second term counterbalances the first, since (with # s =$>0) p i and { i are positively correlated. Considering the effect of this second term, therefore, it is not surprising that the profitability of information sharing depends on the parameters of the specific model.
As noted above, Proposition 4.3 also covers Bertrand markets with cost uncertainty. The important conclusion is that while information sharing leads to the unambiguous change in the correlation of strategies stated in Proposition 4.3 (depending on the information structure), only for the three cases considered in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 is it true that an increase in the correlation of the firms' strategies is profitable for strategic complements, contrary to what is usually believed. In contrast to Gal-Or's [5] interpretation, therefore, the nonprofitability of information sharing in the Bertrand duopoly with cost uncertainty does not arise because of a decrease in the correlation of strategies, but rather despite an increase.
What is remarkable, then, is not the ambiguity observed here but the simplicity of the results of the previous sections. This simplicity hinges on a simple relationship between expected profits and the variances and covariances of the equilibrium strategies which does not exist in the case considered here.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Previous work has fostered the impression that the incentives to share information delicately depend on the details of the model. In contrast, we have shown building on our more general results that the results for the majority of the specific models can be summarized in a very simple way.
Our analysis suggests that some generalizing interpretations of those results found in other works are invalid: (i) As we have argued in 4.5, the assertion that one major determinant encouraging firms to exchange information is an improvement of the information about market conditions is valid only as far as information about own demand or cost is concerned, but then does not apply to models in which firms cannot improve this information, viz. in independent-value or perfect-signal models (which, in fact, comprise at least one half of those used in the literature). (ii) The assertion that the other major determinant of the profitability of information sharing is the induced change in the correlation of strategies is unhelpful, since this change in the correlation is itself endogenous and not easily predicted without explicit formal analysis. In particular, we have shown that for independent-value or perfect-signal models, the correlation always changes in the direction which is profitable for the firms, although this direction depends on the details of the profit function.
Our new alternative interpretation, which applies to all information structures and to all market types considered except for Bertrand markets with cost uncertainty, rests on two separate effects which determine the incentives to reveal information: (1) Letting the rivals acquire a better knowledge of their respective profit functions leads to a higher correlation of strategies, the profitability of which is determined by the slope of the reaction curves. (2) Letting the rivals acquire a better knowledge of one's own profit function is always profitable.
An analysis of the welfare effects of information sharing, not included in this paper, leads to less clear-cut results than with the incentives for firms to share information. In many cases, the direction of change of consumer surplus and total welfare depends on the magnitudes of the parameters of the model. The intuitive conjecture, often found in the nonformal literature, that without collusion information sharing is socially beneficial can by and large be supported, as far as overall welfare is concerned. However, it fails to take into account the impact of a change in the correlation of strategies on profits and the effect on consumers' surplus. In general, producers and consumers have conflicting interests, making a weighting of these interests necessary (cf. Shapiro [19] ).
The understanding of the role of information in oligopoly could be further improved by studying asymmetric information structures in more detail. Situations where firms have differently precise private information have been analyzed by Clarke [2] , Fried [3] , and Sakai [17] .
While in this paper the incentives for firms to reveal private information have been emphasized, two other related issues are the incentives to acquire (costly) information about the own profit functions and finally to receive information about other firms. The first has been pursued by Li et al. [11] , Vives [22] , and recently by Hwang [7] , the second by Fried [3] , Sakai [16] , and Jin [8] .
Despite the generality of the structure used, the present model might be considered restrictive in some respects. It rests on linear-quadratic profit functions, normally distributed random variables, and various symmetry assumptions. Commitment to a revelation strategy and truthtelling are imposed by assumption. In this respect the paper is no more general than previous work. This is certainly a justified criticism which calls for the development of still more general frameworks which allow for an assessment of the robustness of our results.
But while recent research has moved on to generalize certain elements of the earlier models, or probably more fruitfully to develop strategically more sophisticated models which build on the methodological criticisms raised against the standard models (Zvi [24] makes a step in this direction), all the old questions which gave rise to this sort of research have been left unanswered, as forcefully argued by Vives [23] . This paper is a contribution to fill this gap; i.e., though adhering to a restrictive framework, it does lead to a general theory for a large class of models which has been the focus of research for ten years, thus providing a benchmark for departures from this framework.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
Most proofs involve very tedious but straightforward algebra which has been omitted here. The details can be found in Raith [15] .
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Equations (3.1) can be obtained as the firstorder conditions of an appropriately defined team-decision problem in the sense of Radner [14] . Similarly, all higher order conditions for the Nash equilibrium and the solution of the team decision problem are identical. Therefore, we immediately obtain the result by applying Theorem 5 of Radner [14] , where in particular the assumption of normal distributions and the positive definiteness of D ensure that all assumptions of that theorem are satisfied. Noting that @$E( y i y k )= pÄ k and @$E( y i y k )=kp n , we can calculate the variances and obtain
where both terms are positive. K
